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170 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Anticipatory Breach of Contracts to
Devise Property in Return for
Personal Care
ROBERT H. FORD*
INTRODUCTION
In the absence of guaranteed security from the "cradle
to the grave" people who fear old age without the assurance
of companionship, care and support will doubtless continue
to make contracts to get that assurance. In the typical case
the contract is between one who wishes the services of an-
other for the rest of his life and one who is willing to live
with and care for him in return for a promise that the farm
or other property will be his on the promisor's death. It is
not surprising that the parties often develop differences
leading to a rupture of the relationship. While either party
may be in default on the contract, this discussion is limited
to the problems arising where the promisor is in default
and the promisee is seeking a remedy before the promisor's
death. But no abstract appraisal of the legal problems involv-
ed should obscure the intensely human nature of these sit-
uations.
The legal problems involved logically fall into three cate-
gories.:The promisee, in order to obtain relief from the court,
must (1) establish that a contract was actually entered into,
(2) establish that it has been breached, and (3) convince the
court that he has selected the proper remedy. The selection
of the proper remedy, in turn, involves a choice between pro-
ceedings at law and equitable actions.
I.
ESTABLISHING THE CONTRACT
It is well settled that a contract to make a will can be valid
and does not conflict with public policy? While the courts
have scrutinized with care attempts to set up such a con-
tract after the death of the promisor, and have been cautious
in the suspicion that all too often mere expectations ripen
Associate Professor of Law, University of North Dakota.See Atkinson, Wills §68 (1937); Page, Wills §1707 (3d ed. 1941).
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into full-blown contracts after the promisor can no longer
deny them,' this objection has no validity where the promisor
is alive when the action is brought. Most of the courts have
treated these agreements as controlled by the general prin-
ciples of contract law.' Indeed, there seems to be no reason
why the courts should treat them as different in any way
from other contracts. Unfortunately, because the parties sel-
dom secure legal advice, they are usually oral and informal
which gives rise to vexing problems of proof and entangles
the contract in the provisions of the statute of frauds.
A. OFFm AD ACCEPTANCE
The first question raised is whether there is an offer of
sufficient definiteness and certainty to permit of an accep-
tance. The court must be able to understand from the offer
not only what a party is undertaking,' but also, to the same
degree of certainty, what he agrees to take in return for his
promise." The general rule is often announced that the terms
must lend themselves to an exact meaning,' but an examina-
tion of the authorities reveals that the test actually applied
is one of the reasonableness.! The promise is sufficiently certain
if it is one to leave all or a specified share of what one owns
at his death,' but is unenforceable if it is merely a promise to
make a "substantial" gift to the plaintiff,' or if it is a promise
to leave all property not willed to others." Agreements to
leave enough for plaintiff to live in the comfort previously
2 See Hamlin v. Stevens. 177 N.Y. 39, 47, 69 N.E. 118, 120 (1903). Hence
the requirement that the contract be proved by dear, positive, and convinc-
ing evidence. Carlson v. Carlson, 211 Minn. 297, 300 N= . 900 (1941);
see Jannetta v. Jannetta, 205 Minn. 266, 285 N.W. 619, 621 (1939);
Pound, The Progress of the Law, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 929, 933 (1920).
3 Atkinson, Wills § 68 (1937); Page, Wills § 1710 (3d ed. 1941).
4 Restatement, Contracts § 32 (1932); Williston, Contracts §§ 24, 37 (rev.
ed. 1936); 23 Minn. L. Rev. 675 (1939).
See note 4, supra.
6 Williston, Contracts §37 (rev. ed. 1936).
* Restatement, Contracts §32; Page, Wills §1711 (3d ed. 1941). It is said
to be sufficient to satisfy the requirement if the property may be ascer-
tained at the promisor's death. Atkinson Wills § 68 (1937).
* E.g., Howe v. Watson, 179 Mass. 30, 60 N.E. 415 (1901); Svenburg v.
Fosseen, 75 Minn. 350, 78 N.W. 4 (1899).
See Richardson v. Cade. 150 Ga. 535, 104 S.E. 207, 209 (1920).
, Beaver v. Crump, 76 Miss. 34, 23 So. 432 (1898).
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enjoyed,' or enough to keep her free from the necessity of
working," have been held sufficiently certain."
The offer may be for a bilateral or for a unilateral con-
tract,' an issue resolved by the words used and the surround-
ing circumstances. Admittedly the courts have announced a
"presumption" for a bilateral contract and have held that
the assent of the offeree manifested in either words or acts
is by implication the promise requested." This issue will be
pivotal in determining whether a contract has come into be-
ing in a jurisdiction where there is no binding contract un-
til the acts requested in the unilateral offer are fully per-
formed. However, if the offer is construed as one for a uni-
lateral contract, under strict principles of contract law there
can be no binding agreement until the requested act has
been completely performed." Because of the injustice re-
sulting when the acts of acceptance are continuing in na-
ture and extend over a considerable period of time, more
modern authority takes the position that the original offer
Thompson v. Tucker-Osborn, 111 Mich. 470, 69 N.W. 730 (1897); cf.
Collins v Collins, 72 Iowa 104, 33 N.W. 442 (1887).
Thompson v. Stevens, 71 Pa. 161 (1872); and see Elwood's Estate, 309
Pa. 505, 164 At. 617 (1932), where the original promise was to pro-
vide enough to keep plaintiff from working but the amount was rendered
.certain by provision in a subsequently lost will.
The difficulties with respect to "certainty" are not because of inherent
trouble in enunciating a rule; rather they are in applying the established
rules to innumerable complex fact situations. It seems obvious that the
degree of certainty required varies when different remedies are sought. For
example, equity frequently requires greater certainty before granting re-
lief than does a law court, and even though there is sufficient certainty
for some equitable relief there may not be enough for specific perform-
ance.
1" See Restatement, Contracts § 12 (1932); Williston, Contracts § 13 (rev.
ed. 1936).
'2 Restatement, Contracts §31 (1932); Williston, Contracts §31A (rev. ed.
1936).
'6 Petterson v. Pattberg. 248 N.Y. 86, 161 N.E. 428 (1928); Note, 13 Minn.
L. Rev. 366 (1929); and see Williston, Contracts §60 (rev. ed. 1936),
where the author states: "Doubtless wherever possible . . . A court would
and should interpret an offer as contemplating a bilateral rather than a
unilateral contract... "
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cannot be revoked after performance has begun.' In the in-
terests of logical consistency this view would necessitate a
modification of decisions which have held that the offeree
may quit at any time without liability unless the offeror has
changed his position.
When a valid offer and acceptance have been established
the promisor will be bound if a legally sufficient considera-
tion can be found and if the contract does not violate the
Statute of Frauds. A promise to will property is legally suf-
ficient consideration on the one side, as is promising to give,
or the act of giving, personal services on the other.'
B. STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Because these contracts are usually informal and oral they
often fall within the sweep of the Statute of Frauds." It is
necessary to distinguish between contracts involving realty,
those involving personalty, and mixtures of the two for the
purpose of examining the application of the Statute.
Oral contracts to devise realty, seem quite clearly to be
within the provision of Section Four of the Statute, Which
provides that "no action shall be brought . . .upon any con-
tract or sale of lands . . .or any interest in or concerning
1T This is an over-simplification of an extremely complicated problem of
contract law. The cases are in abject confusion as to reasons but tend to
this result. No little expenditure of printer's ink has been made. Some
of the theories advanced to sustain the result of holding the offeror bound
after performance has begun are: (1) after performance has begun, the
contract becomes bilateral; (2) there is an implied collateral promise to
keep the offer open a reasonable length of time, commencement of per-
formance is acceptance of this implied promise and the offer becomes ir
revocable; (3) commencement of the acts is acceptance of the offer
but with the offeror's duties conditioned upon completion by offeree;
and, (4) promissory estoppel based, of course, on the offeree's detri-
ment. For a good treatment of these theories see Note, 13 Minn. L. Rev.
366 (1929); and, in general, see McGovney, Irrevocable Offers, 27
Harv. L. Rev. 644 (1914); Ashley, Offers Calling for a Considera-
tion Other than a Counter Promise, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 159 (1910);
Ballantine, Acceptance of Offers for Unilateral Contracts, 5 Minn. L.
Rev. 94 (1921); Wormser, The True Conception of Unilateral Con-
tracts, 26 Yale L.J. 136 (1916). The Restatement,, Contracts §§45, 90
(1932), has adopted the third and fourth theories, supra, but with some
limitations. The cases are collected and analyzed in Williston, Con-
tracts §60A (rev. ed. 1936).
Brock v. Noecker, 66 N.D. 567, 267 N.W. 656 (1936); Atkinson,
Wills §68 (1937); Page, Wills §1712 (3d. ed. 1941) (many cases col-
lected).
'8 29 Car. 2, c 3 (1677), 4 Chitty's Eng. Stat. 1140 (6th ed., Aggs. 1911).
American jurisdictions have substantially copied the original English
statute. E.g., N.D. Rev. Code §§ 9-0604, 9-0605, and 51,0105 (1943),
and references will be to the working of the original English statute.
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them . . . " That such contracts are almost unanimously so
considered' is not surprising. The ratio decidendi is that
such contracts are essentially to convey by appointment and
are just as effective in transferring interests in land as are
contracts for inter vivos transfers. Inherent in this result is
the thought that there is just as much reason for declaring
such contracts unenforceable as for the inter vivos contract
to convey. As a matter of fact, if support is sought in the
dubious realm of public policy there may be much more reas-
on to declare the contract to devise unenforceable.' That the
vast numerical majority of the cases hold the contract to
devise to be a contract for the "sale" of land and violative
of Section Four of the Statute cannot be doubted,' but the
problem has not been without subtle distinction.'
Where only personalty is involved the question is wheth-
er Section Seventeen is applicable. It provides that: "No
contract for the sale of any goods . . . shall be allowed to be
good . . . " unless there is, among other things, part payment
or earnest money. The argument that the contract to bequeath
bears exactly the same relation to sale of goods as the con-
tract to devise does to the sale of realty, and, therefore, should
be treated exactly the same with respect to the Statute is
a logically conclusive one. But an examination of the cases
See, e.g., Quirk v. Bank of Commerce & Trust Co., 244 Fed. 682 (6th cir.
1917); Olsen v. Dixon, 165 Minn. 124, 205 N.W. 955 (1925); Restate-
ment, Contracts §193, illustration 4 (1932); Williston, Contracts §488 (rev.
ed. 1936); and for an excellent treatment of this general subject, see
Schnebly, Contracts to make Testamentary Dispositions as Affected by the
Statute of Frauds, 24 Mich. L. Rev. 749 (1926). It is evident that con,
tracts to support and care for promisor do not come within the section re-
lating to contracts not to be performed within one year because they may
be performed within that time. Contracts to support for a definite time are
not within the scope of this discussion.
21 See note 2, supra, and text thereto.
23 A large number of the cases are collected in Page, Wills §1717 (3d. ed.
1941).
" E.g., in Stahl v. Stevenson, 102 Kan. 447, 844, 171 Pac. 1164 (1918), the
court held that an agreement to leave a specified portion of the estate was
not within Section Four in spite of the fact that the promisor owned realty
both at the time the promise was made and at his death. This distinction
has been labeled "'plausible" by one writer, inasmuch as the promisor may
die seized only of personality. Schnebly, supra, note 20, at 760. Whatever
its merits, however, it seems to have been largely ignored except in that
jurisdiction. See also Smith v. Nyburg, 136 Kan. 572, 16 P. 2d 493 (1932)
(held not within the Statute because it did not deal with specific real pro-
perty). It would seem that the parties intended the promise to cover both
real and personal property when they refer to all or a given part of the
estate.
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yields no such simple solution. Not only are the cases badly
split, but the secondary authorities disagree." In those juris-
dictions where the contract to bequeath is held not to be
within Section Seventeen, the change in the wording of
that Section by Section Four of the Uniform Sales Act would
not appear to alter that result. Where the courts do find the
contract to bequeath within the Statute, the theory usually
is that the legatee takes as a purchaser just as does the devisee.
Even conceding, arguendo, that such a legatee takes by pur-
chase, it appears that since the Sales Act has omitted the re-
quirement that part payment must be made at the time of
entering the contract, 5 and since services rendered may con-
stitute such part payment,' the requirements of the Statute
have been met.
The third situation is where the contract involves both
realty and personalty. In those jurisdictions which hold
that contracts to devise are within Section Four but con-
tracts to bequeath are not within Section Seventeen, the
question of divisibility becomes pivotal. As has been pointed
out,"2 there exists no good reason why the contract should
not be enforced as to the personalty even though it cannot
be as to the realty. In spite of this, however, the greater
number of cases declare flatly that the contract is indivisible,
and enforceable as to neither personalty nor realty."
The usual "lineal descendant" of the original Statute of
Frauds is construed to render the contract unenforceable
Page, Wills §1717 (3d ed. 1941), states that the contract to bequeath
violates Section Seventeen: Atkinson, Wills §68 (1937); 1 Schouler, Wills,Executors and Administrators §696 (6th ed. 1923); and Schnebly, supra,
note 20, at 756, are contra.
' Uniform Sales Acts § 4, N.D. Rev. Code § 51-0105 (1943). See Void, Sales
§32 (1931).
'4 Driggs v. Bush, 152 Mich. 53, 115 N.W. 985 (1908); cf. White v. Drew,56 How. Pr. 53 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1878). See Vold, Sales §32 (1931);
Schnebly, supra, note 20, at 757.Schnebly, supra, note 20, at 765-67. The a-uthor was referring, however,
to cases where the promisee has fully performed.
See, e.g., Quirk v. Bank of Commerce & Trust Co., 244 Fed. 682 (6th Cir.1917); In re Estate of Roberts, 202 Minn. 217, 277 N.W. 549 (1938);
Atkinson, Wills §68 (1937); Page, Wills §1717 (3d ed. 1941); Schnebly,
supra, note 20, at 765; Note, 71 A.L.R. 479, 485 (1931).
This, again, oversimplifies a problem about which there is much disagree-
ment. That the contracts are merely unenforceable, see Browne, Statute of
Frauds §115 A (5th ed. 1895); Vold, Sales §22 (1931); Williston, Con-
tracts §527 (rev. ed. 1936). The last cited author collects the cases. As to
compliance with the Statute subsequent to the oral contract, see Williston,Contracts §§566, 590 (rev. ed. 1936); Vold, Sales §22 (1931).
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rather than void, and if the contract later fulfills the statutory
requirements it may become enforceable.' Even when the
wording of the statute is that such contracts are "void", it
is arguable that proper construction is that they are merely
voidable."0 Properly speaking, the Statute of Frauds goes to
"judicial authority to afford a remedy" rather than to the
validity of the contract within it.1
The Statute of Frauds is being treated here only to deter-
mine whether or not the contract is enforceable at law. The
question of when part performance will take the contract out
of the Statute for purposes of equitable relief will be treated
under the section dealing with equitable remedies. It is suf-
ficient to point out here that enforceability in equity is not
regarded as enforceability at law.
II.
THE BREACH
Since we are here concerned only with the situation where
the party promising to devise or bequeath the property is
still alive, it necessarily follows that in such a case the con-
tract cannot be broken by non-performance. However, under
the doctrine of anticipatory breach it is obvious that the prom-
isor can be in default. All courts have not agreed that the
promisee has a right of action during the lifetime of the
promisor. Those courts which have refused the promisee a
right of action while the promisor still lives have done so on
the theory that the promisor has all his life in which to per-
form and it cannot be known until his death that he will not
perform." This view is analytically unsound in that the doc-
trine of anticipatory breach is totally ignored, and, in addi-
tion, is indefensible from the practical viewpoint because it
refuses to the promisee the opportunity of proving the con-
The argument is that it is to be doubted that the legislature intended to
change the effect of the English predecessor even though it inserted "void."
It has been said that, though the cases split, the tendency of more modern
authority is to consider "void" as equivalent to "unenforceable." Williston,
Contracts §531 (rev. ed. 1936).
'l See Manufacturers' Light & Heat Co. v. Lamp, 269 Pa. 517, 112 Atd. 679,
681 (1921); Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Diamond Coal &s Coke Co., 234
Pa. 100, 83 At. 54, 58 (1912).
82 Warden v. Hinds, 163 Fed. 201 (4th Cir. 1908); cf. Fitzpatrick v. Michael,
177 Md. 248, 9 A.2d 639 (1939); See Skinner v. Rasche, 165 Ky. 108,
176 S.W. 942, 944 (1915); Lawson v. Mullinix,. 104 Md. 156, 64 Atd.
938, 940 (1906).
ANTICIPATORY BREACH
tract while the promisor is still alive. This is particularly
true in view of the fact that years may elapse before the
promisor's death. Thus, the better view, and that taken by
most courts, is that the promisee may maintain an action
during the promisor's lifetime, if, by the rules of contract
law, there is anticipatory breach."
The anticipatory breaches in these cases fall into three
categories, the presence of one or more of which will support
an immediate right of action.
A. RENUNCIATION
Words or acts by the promisor which clearly show that he
does not intend to perform the contract amount to a breach
by anticipatory repudiation. The position has been taken that
such repudiation does not, of itself, amount to a breach, but
that there must be an election by the promisee to treat the
repudiation as .a breach.' The Restatement of Contracts adopts
the view that the repudiation is itself a total breach of con-
tract, but is subject to nullification if the statements are with-
drawn, or if the facts constituting the repudiation cease to ex-
ist before an action has been brought or there has been other
material change of position."5 Assuming an action is being
brought immediately, there would appear to be very little
practical difference between these views (though it might
affect the running of the statute of limitations). Where the
election is required, the mere bringing of the action without
delay is sufficient."
33 E.g., Richardson v. City Trust Co., 27 F.2d 35 (7th Cir. 1928); Stone v.
Burgeson, 215 Ala. 23, 109 So. 155 (1926); Osborn v. Hoyt, 18r Cal.
336, 184 Pac. 854 (1919); Lovett v. Lovett, 87 Ind. App. 42, 155 N.E.
528, 157 N.E. 104 (1927); Mug v. Ostendorf, 49 Ind. App. 71, 96 N.E.
780 (1911); White v. Massee, 202 Iowa 1304, 211 N.W. 839 (1927);
Chantland v. Sherman, 148 Iowa 352, 125 N.W. 871 (1910); Bracken-
bury v. Hodgkin, 116 Me. 399, 102 Atl. 106 (1917); Bird v. Pope, 73
Mich. 483, 41 N.W. 514 (1889); Carmichael v. Carmichael, 72 Mich.
76, 40 N.W. 173 (1888); Wold v. Wold, 138 Minn. 409, 165 N.W. 229
(1917); Carter v. Witherspoon, 156 Miss. 597, 126 So. 388 (1930); Gup-
ton v. Gupton, 47 Mo. 37 (1870); Duvale v. Duvale, 56 N.J. Eq. 375,
39 Atl. 687, 40 At]. 440 (1898); Davison v. Davison, 13 N.J. Eq. 246
(1861); Van Duyne v. Vreeland, 11 NJ. Eq. 370 (1857), aff'd, 12 N.J.
Eq. 142 (1858). See Van Meter v. Norris, 318 Pa. 137, 177 Atl. 799, 780
(1935).
31 Williston, Contracts §1332 (rev. ed. 1937).
35 Restatement, Contracts §§318, 319 (1932).
36 Williston, Contracts §1323 (rev. ed. 1937).
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Before the defendant's refusal to perform will amount to
an anticipatory breach, it must be positive and unconditional.
No good test has been laid down, nor has a definitive line been
drawn, as to what statements constitute a repudiation; but it
must be remembered that there is a difference between what
will excuse performance by plaintiff and what is a total
breach.' A mere statement of doubt by the promisor as to
whether he will perform may excuse performance by the
promisee, but will not be a breach, whereas an unequivocal
denial of the contract is a repudiation and a total breach.
B. CONVEYANCE OF LAND OR A CONTRACT TO
CONVEY TO A THIRD PARTY
It is broadly stated that a total breach is committed by the
promisor if he transfers, or contracts to transfer, to a third
person an interest in specific land, goods, or in any other thing
essential for the substantial performance of his contractual
duties." Thus, where the contract to devise does not refer to
specific property, the promisor is not prevented from making
conveyances during his lifetime even if they are gratuitous,
so long as the conveyances are reasonable in amount and are
not made to evade performance of the contract.' Consequently,
where the contract calls for devising or bequeathing all he
owns at his death, the test is whether the conveyance is a
fraud upon the rights of the promisee or is made to evade
performance of the contract."
Where the conveyance is a breach of the contract and the
grantee takes gratuitously, or with notice of the rights of the
3' New York L. Ins. Co. v. Viglas, 297 U.S. 672 (1936), 46 Yale L.J. 181
(1936); Restatement, Contracts §318 (a) (1932); Williston, Contracts
§1324 (rev. ed. 1937).
Restatement, Contracts §§280, 323 (1932); Williston, Contracts §1331
(rev. ed. 1937).
" Restatement, Contracts §318 (b) (1932).
40 Rastetter v. Hoenninger, 214 N.Y. 66, 108 N.E. 210 (1915); Van Meter
v. Norris, 318 Pa. 137, 177 Atl. 799 (1935).
41 Sample v. Butler University, 211 Ind. 122, 4 N.E.2d 545, 5 N.E.2d 888
(1936); Powell v. McBlain, 222 Iowa 799, 269 N.W. 883 (1936), 35
Mich. L. Rev. 1022 (1937).
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promisee, recovery may be had against him,"2 but where the
grantee has taken for value and without notice, he incurs no
liability."
C. HINDERING PERFORMANCE
Properly speaking, the prevention or hindrance of perform-
ance on the part of the promisee by the promisor is not an
anticipatory breach. It is so treated for brevity, and it is an-
ticipatory in the sense that it occurs before the promisor's per-
formance is due.
The undertaking of each party to the contract includes by
implication any promise which a reasonable man in the
promisee's position would be justified in understanding was
included." Hence, the promisor impliedly promises not to pre-
vent or hinder performance on the promisee's part which is
requisite for the continuance of a right in favor of the promisee,
or the discharge of a duty by him, and if the promisor does so
hinder or prevent the promisee's performance, he has breached
the contract."
In the contracts under consideration it is apparent that
the promisor can prevent performance by merely leaving the
promisee, or by refusing to permit the promisee to remain on
the promisor's land to give him the personal services and care
called for by the contract. In such a case it seems obvious that
since the contract requires the continuance of a personal re-
lationship, it would be better to regard it as a total breach and
let the parties' rights be determined. This is usually done.
III.
REMEDIES
The remedies available to the promisee depend, of course,
upon the preceding. They also may depend upon the promisee's
" This relief takes the form of injunction against encumbering or disposing
of the property, White v. Massee, 202 Iowa 1304, 211 N.W. 839 (1927);
Davison v. Davison, 13 N.J. Eq. 246 (1861); a decree for reconveyance,
Brackenbury v. Hodgkin, 116 Me. 399, 102 Atd. 106 (1917); cancellation
of the conveyance, Hogan' v. Hogan, 187 Mich. 278, 153 N.W. 678
(1915); or the imposition of a trust, Newman v. French, 138 Iowa 482,
116 N.W. 468 (1908); Van Duyne v. Vreeland, 12 N.J. Eq. 142 (1858).
" Robinette v. Olsen, 114 Neb. 728, 209 N.W. 614 (1926); White v. Mc-
Knight, 146 S.C. 59, 143 S.E. 552 (1928).
44 Sacramento Nav. Co. v. Salz, 273 U.S. 326 (1927); Restatement, Con-
tracts §5 (1932); Williston, Contracts §1293 (rev. ed. 1937).
United States v. Peck, 102 U.S. 64 (1880); Restatement, Contracts §§315,
395, comment c (1932); Williston, Contracts §1293 A (rev. ed. 1937).
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choice of which remedy he desires and, in some cases, whether
he wishes legal or equitable relief. Assuming, then, that there
is a contract in existence and that it has been breached by
the promisor during his lifetime, the promisee may have one
or more remedies.
A. REMEDIES AT LAw
1. ENFORCEABLE CONTRACTS
a. ACTION FOR DAMAGES. If the contract is in writing and
not otherwise violative of the Statute of Frauds, it is legally
enforceable, and upon the promissor's breach promisee may
either maintain an action for damages or rescind and sue in
quasi-contract. In an action on the contract for damages, the
aim of the law is to place the promisee in the position he
would have enjoyed had the promisor faithfully performed
the contract, less what it would have cost him to finish the
performance." The measure of this will be the value of the
property promised, less what it would have cost the promisee
to perform and what the promisee could earn in other employ-
ment after the breach."7 The exact elements of the damages
vary with the promises and duties of the contract, and it is
apparent that inasmuch as it is impossible to know how long
the promisor will live the damages must always be difficult
of proof and might conceivably violate the rules of certainty.
Indeed, this very practical consideration has provided a basis
for equitable action based upon the. inadequacy of the remedy
at law."
b. RESCISSION AND RESTITUTION. The alternative remedy at
law where the legally enforceable contract has been breached
is an action in quasi-contract for restitution based on a rescis-
sion. Rescission of a contract is effected by the act of the party
-usually by timely notice and a tender of the benefits which
he has received."9 However, there will not usually be any nec-
essity of returning or tendering back to the promisor what the
promisee has received under the contract in order to be en-
46 Restatement, Contracts §329 (1932); Williston, Contracts §1338 (rev.
ed. 1937).
4T Roy v. Pos, 183 Cal. 359, 191 Pac. 542 (1920); Edwards v. Slate, 184
Mass. 317, 68 N.E. 342 (1903).
,8 McClintock, Equity §45 (1936).
49 See notes 50, 51, and 52, infra.
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titled to restitution. By the nature of the contracts, only board
and room, or perhaps small money payments, are received by
the promisee. These ordinarily constitute a comparatively
small part of the total consideration and have been disposed of
by the promisee without reason to anticipate the defendant's
breach, and their value can be determined and credited to the
defendant." Despite these holdings the safe course would ap-
pear to be to make tender of the value.
Even though the tender be excused, it is still necessary to
give prompt notice.' Though it has been held that formal no-
tice is not always required, and that the prompt bringing of the
suit may suffice,5 ' difficulty may be avoided by notifying.
Since the restitution is sought for services rendered, it can-
not be restitution in specie, but the money equivalent will be
given. This raises the troublesome problem of how the recovery
is to be measured. The action being in quasi-contract, it theor-
etically seeks the defendant's unjust enrichment. Thus, the
measure of the recovery is the value of the services rendered.
Where the benefit conferred upon the promisor coincides with
the loss to the promisee, this has not been troublesome, but in
the cases where they do not coincide the objective standard
has been used." It is the market value of the services, and not
what the promisor could have procured them for under some
special bargain," nor is it the amount by which the promisor's
total wealth has been increased.' The determination is a dif-
ficult one, and it has aptly been said that
"... it is evident that an evaluation of the kind of
services here involved is no simple matter."'
The sounder view in these cases limits the recovery to the
value of the services rendered without, regard to the terms of
" In these circumstances the Restatement, Contracts §349 (1932), takes the
view that tender is unnecessary. See also Restatement, Restitution §§65, 66
(1937).
" See. e.g., Hennessy v. Bacon, 137 U.S. 78 (1890); Butler Mfg. Co. v. El-
liott & Cox, 211 Iowa 1068, 233 N.W. 669 (1930); Williston, Contracts§1469 (rev. ed. 1937).
Dwinell v. Boehmer, 60 N.D. 302, 234 N.W. 655, 15 Minn. L. Rev. 839
(1931); Moresco v. Foppiana, 92 Cal. 317, 60 P 2d 430 (1936).
Thus, the market value is the measure. Chicago v. Tilley, 103 U.S. 146
(1880); Restatement, Contracts §347, comment c (1932); Williston, Con
tracts §1459 (rev. ed. 1937).
" See supra, note 53.
' Restatement, Contracts § 347, comment c (1932).
In re Superior's Estate, 211 Minn. 108, 300 N.W. 393, 395 (1941).
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the contract fixing the consideration for the services, but the
contract terms may often be used as evidence of fair value.'
Some courts have held the recovery could not exceed the con-
tract price.' As a practical matter the value of the services pro-
bably would seldom exceed the value of the property promised
while the promisor still lives, and since the terms of the con-
tract price depend upon how long the promisor will live, which
cannot be determined, there is great doubt that the contract
will ever serve as a certain guide in ascertaining the measure
of the recovery. '
2. UNENFORCEABLE CONTRACTS
Where the contract is legally unenforceable because of the
Statute of Frauds, the only action at law which the promisee
can maintain is in quasi-contract. Obviously there is no ques-
tion of rescission here involved. It has been said that the rules
governing quasi-contractual recovery outlined immediately
above are the same as those governing quasi-contractual re-
covery upon a contract unenforceable by virtue of the Statute
of Frauds, ° but it is here that the wording and the construction
of the particular Statute becomes important. It will make no
great difference whether the Statute makes the contract void or
voidable since, for the reasons pointed out above, the contract
should not control the amount of recovery in either case. But
if the Statute makes the contract illegal, the effect of giving a
restitutionary remedy would be to nullify the Statute, and re-
67 This view conforms to the theory upon which the action is based, i.e., that
the contract is rescinded. Accord, Schwasnick v. Blandin, 65 F. 2d 354
(2d Cir. 1933); Laiblin v. San Joaquin Agr. Corp., 60 Cal. App. 516, 213
Pac. 529 (1923); Restatement, Contracts § 347, comment c (1932); Willis-
ton, Contracts § 1485 (rev.ed. 1937).See the excellent discussion in Keener,
Quasi-Contracts 290 (1893). The author concludes that the price can be
admitted on the theory of an admission against interest. There are decis
ions to the contrary, however.
See e.g., Oakley v. Duluth Superior Dredging Co., 223 Mich. 478, 194
N.W. 123 (1923); Bailey v. Furleigh, 121 Wash. 207, 208 Pac. 1091
(1922). Such cases seem unsound in that they permit the defendant to
claim protection of a contract which, by hypothesis, he has totally breached.
Naturally, life expectancy tables could be used for this purpose, but in
addition to the inevitable uncertainty, there is the further problem that
due to the nature of the contracts involved, what was really sought by
the promisor was security for life, not merely the rendition of services for
a definite period. There is no doubt that in the usual case the considera
tion promised exceeds the reasonable value of the services to be rendered
if that be computed on the basis of life expectancy tables.
® Restatement, Contracts § 355 (1932).
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lief will not be given." The action will lie whether the contract
is rendered void or voidable, so long as it is not rendered illegal
by the Statute. Oral testimony relating to the contract for the
purpose of proving a transaction whereby the defendant was
unjustly enriched is admissible to negate a gratuity." Even if
the contract itself has been introduced upon the theory of an
admission against interest by either party, the numerical
weight of authority holds that the value of the thing promised
cannot be shown.' Obviously the same rules apply where the
contract is voidable rather than void.
Quasi-contractual recovery may be had where no contract
came into existence at all because of mistake, uncertainty, or
some other reason." If the parties intended that the "promisee"
should receive compensation for the services rendered, then he
may recover the reasonable value of them. The reasonable
value of services gratuitously rendered cannot be recovered. It
is to be noted that there is a judicial presumption that when
members of the same family live together no pecuniary com-
pensation is expected, ur will be paid, for services, care, or sup-
port." Generally, whenever services are rendered, not gratui-
tously, and it appears that the promisor will be unjustly en-
riched if he gives the promisee no compensation for them, a
suit in quasi-contract can be maintained.
a Restatement, Contracts § 355, comment c (1932). E.g., the usual rule seems
to be that there can be no quasi contractual recovery for services render-
ed in procuring a purchaser of land under an oral contract for commis-
sion where the contract is declared void by the statute. See 12 Maiq. L.
Rev. 81 (1927); 4 Wis. L. Rev. 379 (1928). Thus, it is the purpose,
not the form, of the Statute which is important. If quasi contractual re-
covery nullifies the purpose, it should not be allowed. See Restatement,
Contracts § 355 (3) 1932).
Gay v. Mooney, 67 N.J. L. 27, 50 At. 596 (1901); Woodward, Quasi-
Contracts § 103 (1913).
See supra, note 59. It is difficult to see how the price agreed upon for ser-
vices to be performed for the rest of the promisor's life can be an ad-
mission of the value of services for a specific period. Moreover, a distfnc-
tion is made between the case where the promisor has agreed to pay a
sum certain in money for services of a known extent, and the case under
consideration. i.e., where property is to be given for services, the extent
of which cannot be ascertained. Quirk v. Bank of Commerce, 244 Fed.
682 (6th Cir. 1917); Woodward, Quasi-Contracts § 105 (1913), and
cases cited therein.
" See, e.g., Schmetzer v. Broegler, 92 N.J.L. 88, 105 At. 450 (1918); Col-
lier v. Rutledge. 136 N.Y. 621, 32 N.E. 626 (1892); Keener, Quasi-
Contracts 267 (1893); Woodward, Quasi-Contracts § 45 (1913).
' E.g., Gopcevic v. Gopcevic, 39 Cal. App. 306, 178 Pac. 734 (1918);
Hartley v. Bohrer, 52 Idaho 72, 11 P.2d 616 (1932); In re Docius' Es-
tate, 215 Iowa 1191, 247 N.W. 796 (1933); Woodward, Quasi-Contracts§ 51 (1913).
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B. REMEDIES IN EQUITY
1. IN GENERAL
All of the problems of establishing the contract and its
breach discussed above, with some exceptions as to the ap-
plicability of the Statute of Frauds, exist when the remedy
sought is equitable. Moreover, the general principles of equity
brought into play impose certain additional requirements. Thus,
it is said that the contract must be clear and certain beyond
that certainty required by law for the creation of a binding ob-
ligation." The contract must'be fair in light of the circum-
stances surrounding the transaction when entered;6" and the
mere fact that the promisor may die sooner than expected does
not render the contract unfair ab initio if it was fair at the
time it was entered.' The equity court grants the remedy, if
at all, as a matter of discretion," and if there is hardship on the
defendant, inequitable conduct on the plaintiff's part, or mis-
take, the remedy may be refused even though there is no ade-
quate remedy at law.
It is perhaps trite to say that equity is not bound to give its
relief in any rigid or stereotyped form.'
2. ESTABLISHING EQUITY JURISDICTION
While law and equity are no longer separate, it is still nec-
essary to establish a basis for the court's exercise of its juris-
diction to grant the equitable relief asked. Of the historical
bases of equity jurisdiction which are still recognized, a good
many have been or could be utilized by the courts when con-
fronted by the type of case with which we are here concerned.
All of these are encompassed within the general rule that
where the legal remedy is not adequate, equity will intervene
to give relief.' Equity jurisdiction can be tested from the view-
point of both the plaintiff and the defendant. Regardless of the
legal remedy available, where the contract involves realty
e Restatement, Contracts § 370, comment b (1932); McClintock, Equity § 54
(1936).61 Owens v. McNally, 113 Cal. 444, 45 Pac. 710 (1896); Haubrich v. Hau
brich, 118 Minn. 394, 136 N.W. 1025 (1912); Hamlin v. Stevens, 177
N.Y. 39, 69 N.E. 118 (1903).
Howe v. Watson, 179 Mass. 30, 60 N.E. 415 (1901).
McClintock, Equity § 21 (1936).
Id. at § 28.
" Id. at §§ 38, 41.
ANTICIPATORY BREACH
equity has long taken jurisdiction on the theory that each tract
of land is unique and the law could not give to the plaintiff the
interest in the land to which he was equitably entitled, even
though money damages might be ascertainable. "
Even though the contract does not involve realty there is a
basis for equitable intervention irrespective of whether the
contract is legally enforceable or not. The rule is laid down that
if the services rendered are of such a peculiar personal and
domestic nature as not to be adequately compensable in money,
the legal remedy is inadequate. "' Moreover, though the value
of the services might be ascertained, the plaintiff's prospective
profits cannot, and the mere fact that quantum meruit lies does
not defeat equity jurisdiction. Usually the value of intimate
family companionship and personal care cannot be measured in
money," but this is subject to the particular facts." No rigid
standard has been laid down, nor can one be, to determine what
is compensable in money and what is not."8
Another possible basis for equitable jurisdiction exists where
it can be shown that the promisor cannot respond in money
damages." Where the defendant is execution proof it may be a
practical impossibility to collect money damages. The crux of
the problem is whether an ineffective remedy at law is neces-
sarily an inadequate remedy at law. If the equity court holds
that it is, then it will take jurisdiction and give relief on the
general principle of the inadequacy of the legal remedy.
Difficulties of a different type arise where the remedy at law
is inadequate because the contract is within the Statute of
Frauds and therefore unenforceable. Under the doctrine of
part performance equity will take jurisdiction for the purpose
of specifically performing such a contract. It might be noted
that North Dakota has embodied this rule in a statute which.
72 Id. at § 42.
.3 See infra, notes 74, 75, 76.
' See, e.g., Sutton v. Hayden, 62 Mo. 101 (1876); Emery v. Darling, 50
Ohio St. 160, 33 N.E. 715 (1893).
In Happel v. Happel, 184 Minn. 377, 238 N.W. 783 (1931), the court
recognized the general rule, but did not apply it to the facts presented.
For illustrative cases which have refused equitable relief where the ser-
vices seemed of a highly personal nature, see Speck v. Dodson, 178 Ark.
549, 11 S.W.2d 456 (1928); Brennen v. Derby, 124 Ore. 574, 265 Pac.
425 (1928).
See McClintock, Equity § 45 (1936); McClintock, Adequacy of Inef-fective Remedy at Law, 16 Minn. L. Rev. 233 (1932).
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provides that the Statute of Frauds does not abridge the pow-
er of the courts of equity to compel the specific performance of
agreements in case of part performance thereof."5 The perform-
ance of services should be considered such part performance
as will take the contract out of the Statute of Frauds, for equity
purposes, if the services cannot be adequately compensated by
a money payment." The result is that where the services ren-
dered are peculiarly personal in their nature, the legal remedy
is inadequate, the contract should be considered taken out of
the Statute of Frauds, and equity will give relief.
The issue of equity jurisdiction has usually been raised in
these particular cases by the plaintiff asking for specific per-
formance on the basis that land is involved or the contract is
within the Statute of Frauds. As will be pointed out below, it
is technically impossible for equity to give specific perform-
ance in this type of case. However, it would seem that in spite
of this, equity jurisdiction is doubtless justified in all cases
where the services are not pecuniarily compensable, for the le-
gal remedy is clearly inadequate.
3. EQUITABLE RELIEF
a. AGAINST THE PROMISOR. The court, having been induced
to exercise its equitable powers, will adapt the relief to the par-
ticular facts of the case, being solely concerned with effectuat-
ing justice. Obviously this is no simple matter, and a review of
the cases indicates that the courts have been faced with a vir-
tual impossibility. The decrees rendered are not easily categor-
ized but are constituted of those tending to continue the rela-
tionship, and those foreseeing its possible discontinuance.
N.D. Rev. Code § 47,1001 (1943). This is not an unusual provision. See,
e.g., 2 Minn. Stat. § 513.06 (1949).
9 For cases which have regarded this as a sufficient part performance, see
Owens v. McNally, 113 Cal. 444, 45 Pac. 710 (1896); Fierke v. Elgin
City Bkg. Co., 359 111. 394, 194 N.E. 528 (1935); Whitman v. Dittman,
154 Minn. 346. 191 N.W. 821 (1923); Matheson v. Gullickson, 222
Minn. 369, 24 N.W.2d 704 (1946). And see O'Connor v. Immele, 43
N.W.2d 649 (N.D. 1950). Other jurisdictions do not recognize the per-
formance of these services as sufficient part performance in the absence
of a transfer of possession of realty, see Waters v. Cline, 121 Ky. 61-1, 85
S.W. 209 (1905); Kling v. Bordner, 65 Ohio St. 86, 61 N.E. 148 (1901);
Richardson v. Orth, 40 Ore. 252, 66 Pac. 925, 69 Pac. 455 (1902).
Much of the disagreement about what constitutes part performance has
been cast in precedents formulated to govern ordinary real estate transac-
tions. It is submitted that when the services are so clearly not compen,
sable as in these cases, a stronger case is. made out for equitable interven.
tion by way of part performance.
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Of the decrees tending to continue the relationship, "specific
performance" is by far the most common, probably because the
promisee usually desires the property itself since it is often far
greater in value than any possible evaluation of the services
rendered. The courts have used the term very loosely inasmuch
as such a contract by its very nature can never be specifically
enforced. This is true both before and after the promisor's
death, because the promise is to devise something to the prom-
isee and to enforce it would be to order the promisor to make
the agreed will and then not revoke it. Even assuming that it
is not against public policy to do so, the difficulty of enforce-
ment would preclude the attempt. If it were possible to give
specific performance, the doctrine of mutuality would have to
be overcome, and this has troubled some courts"° which have
mistakenly thought such a contract could be specifically en-
forced in the technical meaning of that term. Where this issue
has been squarely raised, it has been denied that a suit for an
injunction against interference with the carrying out of the;
contract to care for and support the defendant is in reality
negative specific performance. The court held that neither
negative nor positive specific performance could be given, but
that the injunction lies on the theory of a bill quia timet to pre-
serve the plaintiff's rights in the contract and property, and to
protect the plaintiff in performance, that he may ultimately
derive the benefits of the contract." Where the doctrine of mu-
tuality is followed, since equity would not enforce a contract
calling for personal services against the plaintiff because of
public policy, as expressed in the prohibition against involun-
tary servitude, the contract will not be enforced against de-
fendant, though other equitable relief may be given. The doc-
trine of mutuality applies only to specific performance and
since these cases do not involve true specific performance, it
should have no application. Moreover, the doctrine appears to
be of sharply reduced efficacy, the modern view being that a
mere lack of mutuality is not a sufficient reason for refusing
specific performance if the future performance of plaintiff is
well secured to the satisfaction of the court.'
I See, e.g., Nunn v. Boal, 29 Ohio App. 141, 162 N.E. 724 (1928) (re-
fusing relief).
81 White v. Massee, 202 Iowa 1304, 211 N.W. 839 (1927).
The Restatement, Contracts §§ 372, 373 (1932), adopts the modern ap-
proach. See generally, McClintock, Equity § 66 (1936).
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Many courts recognize that specific performance cannot be
given, but have afforded relief analogous to it. Such has been
denominated "quasi-specific performance"" and "relief in the
nature of specific performance"." It usually takes the form of
a trust which is often coupled with an injunction. This relief,
which proceeds on the theory of a bill quia timet to protect the
plaintiff from future harm,"8 also has the effect of continuing
the relationship. There appears to be no theoretical objection
to allowing a bill quia timet,, but it is submitted that any re-
lief which looks toward the continuance of the relationship ig-
nores the practical aspects of the parties' situation. Where they
have disagreed to the point of litigation, it seems obvious that
no contract based upon a relationship so personal in its nature
that money cannot compensate the promisee for his services,
can be restored and continued with any degree of satisfaction
by the courts. To base a decree upon the premise that the par-
ties will continue to perform the contract would appear to
make additional litigation probable. The courts sometimes
clearly recognize the difficulty involved, as the New Jersey
Court did in the Davison case,' when it stated-
"It is eminently desirable that this controversy should
be amicably adjusted, and the court repeats the hope
expressed on the argument, that a settlement may be
effected between the parties without further action
on the part of the court. No present decree for the spec-
ific performance of the contract can be made. By the
terms of the contract, promisee is to provide for his
father during his life. If the father refuses to accept
the services of the complainant, and no amicable ad-
justment can be made, further directions will be given
for the management of the farm and the support of the
father during his life."
83 E.g.. Notten v. Mensing, 3 Cal. 2d 469, 45 P.2d 198 (1935); Costigan,
Constructive Trusts Based on Promises Made to Secure Bequests, Devises,
or Intestate Succession, 28 Harv. L. Rev. 237 (1915).
E.g., Matheson v. Gullickson, 222 Minn. 369, 24 N.W.2d 704 (1946):
Simonson v. Moseley, 183 Minn. 525, 237 N.W. 413 (1931); Costigan,
supra note 83.
8 This approach had early been enunciated by the New Jersey courts, and
has been widely used. See Van Dsyne v.Vreeland, 12 N.J. Eq. 142 (1858);
Davison v. Davison, 13 N.J. Eq. 246 (1861).
s0 There are obvious advantages to be gained through its use. While the evi-
dence is still obtainable, the contract can be established and the decree,
if properly recorded, can prevent a transfer to a bona fide purchaser.
s Supra, note 85, at 253.
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But they sometimes appear to discount the difficulty, as the
Minnesota court did in the Matheson case,' by stating-
"In the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction, the court
will find no difficulty in making satisfactory provision
for the preservation of plaintiff's right with due re-
gard to the full protection of the interests of the sur-
viving promisor. Obviously, the surviving promisor is
entitled to full use during her lifetime and no restric-
tion should be placed upon her right to consume or
dispose of the property except insofar as a disposition
thereof may be a fraud upon her agreement with plain-
tiff. She is likewise entitled to continued perform-
ance by the promisee until her death."
On the other hand some decrees look to the possibility that
the relationship may be severed permanently, and attempt to
provide not only relief for the promisee but also protection for
the promisor. The relief granted is frequently conditioned upon
the promisee continuing to perform, or remaining ready to do
so if prevented by the promisor.
Thus, in White v. Masee, the maxim that "He who seeks
equity must do equity" was applied by the court in ordering
the successful plaintiff to make regular money payments to
the promisor. In discussing the possibility that the duties of the
contract might not be carried out in the future, the court
said&_-
"Owing to the unfortunate breach with plaintiff, he
(promisor) may find it morally impossible to return
to her home. It is evident... that the son and his wife
might refuse to take care of him. The court, in impos-
ing conditions to the granting of equitable relief, is
not restrained by the strict legal rights of the parties,
but may impose such terms as are demanded by justice
and regard for righteous conduct."
But this is protection for the promisor only if he successfully
brings an action to set aside the injunction or trust imposed
upon the property if plaintiff subsequently defaults, and this
might be very difficult to do. It is also open to the objection
that it requires another lawsuit. Moreover, while this view re-
cognizes and attempts to provide for this very realistic prob-
lem, it would seem that there is an apparent logical inconsis-
Matheson v. Gullickson, 222 Minn. 369, 24 N.W.2d 704, 709 (1946).White v. Massee, 202 Iowa 1304, 211 N.W. 839, 842 (1927).
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tency. If the basis of equity intervention is the theory that the
relief is necessary because mere money cannot compensate
plaintiff for the rendering of peculiarly personal services, then,
by the same token, the payment of money to defendant would
not compensate him for the loss of future services. Hence he is
not adequately protected against plaintiff's defaults in the fu-
ture. But it is to be kept in mind that if either of necessity is to
be inadequately protected, certainly the court should look first
to the rights of the one who is not in default. It is submitted
that of the approaches suggested, the White case comes closest
to protecting both parties. In any event the promisor has pro-
bably lost that peculiarly personal companionship and affec-
tion for which he bargained no matter how the decree is fram-
ed, and the lack of protection as to the promisee's future per-
formance of the contract may be of little importance to him
from the practical viewpoint. It is, perhaps, the price he must
pay for having breached the agreement, but an award of money
so that he may secure such care as money will buy certainly
seems to be amply justified. It is, of course, true that the de-
cree must ultimately turn on the facts of the particular case
and on the nature of the breach. As was said in the opinion
handed down in the Matheson case-
"The general principles which govern are well estab-
lished. Their application, however, is difficult and in-
volves a careful consideration of the total effect of
the combination of facts and circumstances peculiar
to each case. In doing equity, a common factual de-
nominator for the reconciliation of all cases is out of
the question. Similar facts produce and reflect differ-
ent equitable considerations according to the varied
setting in which they are found."'"
b. AGAINST THIRD PARTIES. As has been pointed out-
above one of the ways in which the promisor may breach the
contract is to convey the land to a third person. The question is
raised as to whether the plaintiff can go against such third per-
son. When the promisor has conveyed the land to be devised to
a third person who takes gratuitously or with notice, the deed
may be declared a fraud and the conveyance cancelled," a trust
g Supra, note 88, 24 N.W.2d at 707.
See, e.g., Bird v. Pope, 73 Mich. 483, 41 N.W. 514 (1889); Hogan v.
Hogan, 187 Mich. 278, 153 N.W. 678 (1915); Davison v. Davison, 13
N.J. Eq. 246 (1861).
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imposed on the land," a reconveyance decreed," or an injunc-
tion given against a conveyance by the grantee." Similarly, if
the promisor has given a mortgage gratuitously, or for a con-
sideration greatly less than the true consideration, equity will
set it aside. Where the trust is imposed the third person is usu-
ally ordered to convey to the promisee upon the promisor's
death. The reason assigned for this is that the promisee's right
to the land will not vest until the promisor's death, and the
promisee has no such right as will compel a present convey-
ance.
4. CONCLUSION
Many problems must be faced before the question of what
remedy should be given is reached. Equity in these cases has
been faced with a situation with which even its great elastic-
ity has not, and cannot, completely cope. From the very nature
of the case it seems impossible to devise a remedy which will
adequately protect both parties, yet equity, by adapting its re-
lief to the particular facts, can afford the only relief which
even approaches a sound solution.
92 Osborn v. Hoyt, 181 Cal. 336, 184 Pac. 854 (1919); Newman v. French,
138 Iowa 482, 116 N.W. 468 (1908); Van Duyne v. Vreeland, 12 N.J.
Eq. 142 (1858).
Brackenbury v. Hodgkin, 116 Me. 399, 102 At. 106 (1917).
" White v. Massee, 202 Iowa 1304, 211 N.W. 839 (1927); Bird v. Pope,
supra, note 91; Davison v. Davison, supra, note 91.
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